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FORCED PATRIOT ACTS
ALAN K. CHEN t
In the traumatic and emotionally disruptive period immediately fol-
lowing the September 11 th terrorist attacks, many Americans turned to a
variety of collective and individual expressions of patriotism as a source
of comfort t The nation's leading retailer reported that sales of American
flags skyrocketed.2 At many public events, people belted out patriotic
songs. Indeed, Commissioner Bud Selig decreed that major league base-
ball teams regularly broadcast God Bless America instead of Take Me
Out to the Ball Game during the seventh inning stretch.3 Red, white, and
blue bumper stickers bearing a variety of well-worn nationalist slogans
became ubiquitous.4 Public statements of unity such as these are a pre-
dictable and understandable response to the perception that the nation's
security is threatened, as people search for connection and certainty.
5
t Professor, University of Denver College of Law. B.A., Case Western Reserve University,
1982; J.D., Stanford Law School, 1985. This essay was originally presented at a symposium on
March 5, 2004. Thanks to David Bogen, Erwin Chemerinsky, Richard Fallon, Stephen Feldman,
Abner Greene, Martin Katz, William Marshall, Julie Nice, Ann Scales, and Mark Tushnet for their
thoughtful comments on earlier iterations of this essay, to the Denver University Law Review staff
for organizing this symposium and inviting me to participate, and to students Suzanne Rauch and
Tara Dunn for sharing their thoughts about my symposium presentation. I am also grateful for the
outstanding research assistance of Jared Briant and Rhoda Hafiz, and for the extensive support of our
library's Faculty Services Liaison, Diane Burkhardt. In the interest of candor, I should disclose that I
have been legal counsel in some of the disputes discussed in this essay, including Lane v. Owens,
No. 03-B-1544 (PAC) (D. Colo.), see infra note 146, the "Dread" Scott Tyler flag art controversy,
see infra notes 127-37, and Aubin v. City of Chicago, No. 89 CH 8763 (Cook Co. Cir. Ct.), see infra
note 136. This essay is dedicated to my wife, Anne Ertman, a devoted public school teacher who
teaches students to think for themselves.
1. People also commonly turn to religion in such circumstances. For a thoughtful account of
the role and limits of public religious statements in times of crisis, see William P. Marshall, The
Limits of Securalism: Public Religious Expression in Moments of National Crisis and Tragedy, 78
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 11 (2002).
2. Debbie Howlett, Post-9/ll Flags Due for Repair, Replacements, USA TODAY, Mar. 28,
2002, at A3 (reporting that Wal-Mart's retail sales of United States flags for the two months follow-
ing September 11 th had risen ten-fold).
3. Jack Curry, Flags, Songs and Tears, and Heightened Security, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 18,
2001, at C 15. Teams were also given the option to play the song immediately prior to games. Id.
4. Jim Shea, Patriotic Buy Bumper Crop of Stickers, THE TIMES UNION, Oct. 29, 2001, at
C3.
5. One might offer another interpretation of these events as a reflection of Americans turning
to civil religion during a critical and unstable time. The controversial concept of an American civil
religion suggests that there is a common set of "beliefs, symbols, and rituals" to which Americans
adhere and relate in a manner analogous to, but distinct from, theistic religion. See Robert N. Bellah,
Civil Religion in America, in BEYOND BELIEF: ESSAYS ON RELIGION IN A POST-TRADITIONAL
WORLD 175 (1970). As one commentator describes Bellah's visualization of this concept, "civil
religion provides a secular set of norms and values formerly shared by a society that was homogene-
ous and united religiously, economically, and socially." Alexandra D. Furth, Comment, Secular
Idolatry and Sacred Traditions: A Critique of the Supreme Court's Secularization Analysis, 146 U.
PENN. L. REV. 579, 597 (1998). Some modern commentators, however, have reinterpreted civil
religion to include aspects of sacral religion as well. Id. at 596. A complete consideration of the civil
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The government was not far behind. The United States House of
Representatives adopted a concurrent resolution of solidarity, encourag-
ing American citizens to display the United States flag for thirty days
after the attacks.6 Later in the year, the House designated September 11 th
as "Patriot Day."7 At the state and local level, lawmakers introduced nu-
merous measures designed to instill patriotic and nationalistic feelings
and promote civic education in children.8
While hortatory and symbolic measures ordinarily have little impact
on civil liberties, public officials did not confine their post-September
1lth responses to what we might call measures of comfort. In perhaps
the most predictable government response to the terrorist attacks, public
officials in many jurisdictions proposed, and in many cases adopted,
measures forcing individuals to participate in public acts of patriotism
without regard to those individuals' consciences or personal beliefs. Fo-
cusing on schoolchildren, these laws required students to publicly engage
in patriotic acts, such as flag salutes, exercises, and ritual recitation of the
Pledge of Allegiance. 9
This type of governmental reaction to the terrorist attacks is consis-
tent with a cycle that has repeated itself throughout modem history. Over
at least the past century, a pattern has emerged in which the state repeat-
edly has responded to perceived national security fears with, among
other things, laws that force American citizens to demonstrate their loy-
alty by participating in public expressions of patriotism or refraining
from unpatriotic speech.
Legal scholars recently have reflected a great deal on the broader
civil liberties impact of government responses generated as part of the
post-September 1lth "war on terrorism."10 Their work has scrutinized
direct regulation of private conduct through measures such as the USA
PATRIOT Act," which are putatively designed to address terrorist
threats and other national security concerns. Some scholars assert that the
religion aspects of forced patriot acts is beyond the scope of this essay, but is surely worth incorpo-
rating into a broader discussion of the role of ceremonial nationalism in response to national crises.
6. 2001 House Concurrent Resolution 225 (Sept. 13, 2001).
7. 2001 House Concurrent Resolution 71 (Dec. 18, 2001).
8. John Gehring, States Weigh Bills to Stoke Students' Patriotism, EDUCATION WEEK, Mar.
27, 2002, at 19.
9. See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. § 22-1-106(2) (2003) (removed from the statute in 2004); 24
PENN. STAT. § 7-771 (held unconstitutional by Circle Schools v. Pappert, 381 F.3d 172 (3d Cir.
2004)).
10. See, e.g., David Cole, The New McCarthyism: Repeating History in The War on Terror-
ism, 38 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 1 (2003); Neal Devins, Congress, Civil Liberties, And The War on
Terrorism, II WM. & MARY BILL RTs. J. 1139 (2003); Anthony Lewis, Civil Liberties in a Time of
Terror, 2003 Wis. L. REV. 257; Mark Tushnet, Defending Korematsu?: Reflections on Civil Liber-
ties in Wartime, 2003 Wis. L. REV. 273. For a pre-September 11 th account of the impact of war on
civil liberties, see WILLIAM H. REHNQUIST, ALL THE LAWS BUT ONE: CIVIL LIBERTIES IN WARTIME
(1998).
11. Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept
and Obstruct Terrorism (USA PATRIOT) Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-56, 115 Stat. 272.
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severity of government reactions to national security crises diminishes
over time and with experience, or at least that such experience meaning-
fully alters the manner in which the government responds to contempo-
rary crises.' 2 This argument suggests that a form of "social learning" may
occur when later generations look back in hindsight at government over-
reactions to national security threats, thus reducing the possibility that
civil liberties violations will recur.'
3
No one has seriously examined forced patriotism laws in the wake
of September 1 lth or attempted to identify whether political, social, or
judicial reactions to such laws differ in any meaningful way from reac-
tions to more instrumental policy measures. In this essay, I describe the
historical pattern of forced patriotism laws and offer some explanations
for the recurring national impulse to adopt such laws. This impulse is
particularly curious in light of the fact that the unconstitutionality of such
measures has been unequivocally clear for more than half a century.' 4
The pattern is also unusual given our experience with such laws; while
lawmakers claim that these laws promote unity, these regulations have in
fact generated extraordinary divisiveness in American society. 15 I con-
clude that several factors distinguish forced patriotism laws from other
measures that impair civil liberties, making the former less susceptible to
the social learning that may occur in other areas.
I. THE CONCEPT OF FORCED PATRIOTISM
As with ll speech regulations, laws promoting forced patriotism
may operate in- one of two basic ways - by chilling expression or by
compelling it. In the first case, the government may adopt measures that
punish persons for engaging in expression deemed to be disloyal or to
undermine national unity. One needs only to look at the recent furor over
presidential candidate John Kerry's reported treatment of medals from
his service in Vietnam to understand the power of icons in American
culture. 16 Laws forbidding flag burning or other forms of flag desecration
are prototypical of this type of forced patriotism measure. Such laws
dictate silence where dissident expression would undermine patriotism or
respect for state-designated values or icons, yet do not advance, or even
12. See, e.g., Tushnet, supra note 10, at 287-90.
13. Id.
14. See W. Va. Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943).
15. As just one example, the Supreme Court's first flag salute case upholding a mandatory
Pledge of Allegiance law, Minersville School Dist. v. Gobitis, 310 U.S. 586 (1940), led to waves of
horrific violence against Jehovah's Witnesses across the nation. PETER IRONS, THE COURAGE OF
THEIR CONVICTIONS 22-23 (1988); Vincent Blasi & Seana V. Shiffrin, The Story of West Virginia
State Board of Education v. Bamette: The Pledge of Allegiance and the Freedom of Thought, in
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW STORIES 443-45 (Michael C. Dorf, ed., 2004) [hereinafter, Blasi & Shiffrin].
Although this tragic episode demonstrates the breadth of hostility towards dissenters, the federal
government did eventually take some action to compel state and local officials to address these
attacks. ROBERT GOLDSTEIN, POLITICAL REPRESSION IN MODERN AMERICA 283 (1978) [hereinafter,
GOLDSTEIN, POLITICAL REPRESSION].
16. See Wesley K. Clark, Medals of Honor, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 28, 2004, at A21.
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purport to advance, security in any meaningful way. These regulations
could be described as "forced silence" patriotism laws.
More commonly, forced patriotism regulations appear in the form
of regulations compelling public affirmations of patriotism, loyalty, and
respect. Typical of these regulations are laws mandating that broad, un-
differentiated categories of persons take loyalty oaths, laws forcing indi-
viduals to salute or otherwise gesture in support of national icons such as
the United States flag, and laws directing individuals to recite or sing
patriotic texts, such as the Pledge of Allegiance or the National Anthem.
These measures might be labeled "forced speech" patriotism laws.
Both types of forced patriotism laws involve government efforts to
venerate symbols of nationalism and otherwise foster a sense of national
unity, as opposed to tangible measures, successful or not, to enhance
security. In this way, forced patriot acts are distinguishable from specific
policy initiatives that have been designed to protect the nation (e.g., in-
ternment, incarceration of activists who interfere with the draft), but have
resulted in other civil liberties threats that have haunted Americans.
When we look at laws that in one way or another compel patriotism, we
are focused on government efforts to manipulate symbols as opposed to
instrumentalist (or putatively instrumentalist) measures to address
threats. 17 As I discuss later, this distinction becomes important when we
examine the capacity for social learning about forced patriotism.
In terms of conventional free speech theory, both types of forced
patriotism laws implicate values central to the First Amendment's pro-
tection of expression.' 8 First, forced patriotism laws involve viewpoint
discrimination because they regulate persons with reference to their dis-
sident views. Forced silence patriotism laws censor those whose speech
is deemed to undermine national unity or convey disrespect.' 9 Similarly,
forced speech patriotism laws discriminate against those who do not
agree with the compulsory imposition of the government's prescribed
message. Those who agree with the mandatory recitation of the state's
script, and the corresponding compulsion of political orthodoxy, are un-
17. I am grateful to both Richard Fallon and Mark Tushnet for helping me to clarify this
important distinction.
18. U.S. CONST. amend I. It is beyond the scope of this essay to explore the nuances of First
Amendment theory. For elaboration on such theory, see, e.g., L. TRIBE, AMERICAN
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, § 12-1-12-2, at 785-94 (2d ed. 1988); LEE C. BOLLINGER, THE TOLERANT
SOCIETY: FREEDOM OF SPEECH AND EXTREMIST SPEECH IN AMERICA (1986); Thomas Scanlon, A
Theory of Freedom of Expression, 1 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 204, 213-18 (1972); Vincent Blasi, The
Checking Value in First Amendment Theory, 1977 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 521.
19. See, e.g., Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 413 n.9 (1989) ("[Slurely one's attitude toward
the flag and its referents is a viewpoint.").
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burdened by the law, whereas those who disagree with the state's mes-
sage (or agree with the message, but still wish to remain silent) may be
penalized for failing to comply.
20
The state's favoritism of patriotic, loyal viewpoints, in turn, com-
promises free speech values by distorting the composition of public dis-
course often described as the marketplace of ideas, thus portraying a
false sense of national unity. Moreover, censorship of dissent may have
implications for democracy and the possibilities of normal political
change. Electoral upheaval is unlikely where false perceptions of uni-
form public satisfaction are pervasive.
In addition to these considerations, forced speech patriotism laws
implicate distinct and independent free speech concerns. First, govern-
ment compulsion to speak a particular word or set of words implicates a
fundamental constitutional value because the First Amendment guaran-
tees individuals' right to refrain from speaking.2' One aspect of this
speech interest is to ensure that the speaker not be wrongly associated
with the government-prescribed message, which may not represent her
actual beliefs.22 On this account, the state offends the First Amendment
by forcing the speaker to act as the government's mouthpiece. The Court
endorsed constitutional protection of this interest in West Virginia Board
of Education v. Barnette,23 which invalidated a school board rule forcing
students to recite the Pledge of Allegiance. As Justice Jackson wrote in
his majority opinion, "no official, high or petty, can prescribe what shall
be orthodox in politics, nationalism, religion, or other matters of opinion
or force citizens to confess by word or act their faith therein. 24 This
20. See, e.g., W. Va. Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 644 (1943) ("[Llaws must, to be
consistent with the First Amendment, permit the widest toleration of conflicting viewpoints consis-
tent with a society of free men.").
21. See, e.g., Pac. Gas & Elec. Co. v. Pub. Utils. Comm'n of Cal., 475 U.S. 1, 18 (1986)
(invalidating regulation requiring utility company to include solicitations for reform organization
with its bills four times a year because it risked forcing the utility "to speak where it would prefer to
remain silent."); Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705, 714 (1977) (striking down state law forbidding
residents to cover up the message "Live Free or Die" on state-issued license plates); Barnette, 319
U.S. at 645 ("The right of freedom of thought ... as guaranteed by the Constitution against State
action includes both the right to speak freely and the fight to refrain from speaking at all, except in
so far as essential operations of government may require it for the preservation of an orderly soci-
ety." (Murphy, J., concurring)).
22. See, e.g., Wooley, 430 U.S. at 713-15. Some commentators question whether this value is
truly at stake in forced speech cases. See Blasi & Shiffrin, supra note 15, at 433, 456.
[T]he mandatory recitation of the pledge did not require any individual to speak her mind
or to make any statement that even appeared to represent her thoughts as an individual
.... There is really scant risk here that a participant will be understood or misunderstood
as communicating her personal patriotism or her authentic pledge of allegiance.
Id.
Abner S. Greene, The Pledge of Allegiance Problem, 64 FORDHAM L. REV. 451, 474 (1995) ("[S]o
long as the speech act is compelled and is known by a reasonable observer to be compelled, it would
be unreasonable for such an observer to view the message contained in the communication as neces-
sarily a revelation of the speaker's beliefs.").
23. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624.
24. Id. at 642.
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concern relates to what Jed Rubenfeld calls the "anti-orthodoxy princi-
ple," which suggests that it is simply not within the state's power to
mandate acceptable positions on issues of public importance. 5
A broader argument suggests that forced speech laws compromise
the right of autonomy rather than of pure speech. This understanding of
Barnette and its progeny asserts that forced speech laws fundamentally
interfere with individuals' internal deliberative processes more so than
the freedom to not speak. 26 As Professors Blasi and Shiffrin have re-
cently written:
Requiring potentially insincere recitation, and especially rote and pe-
riodic recitation, poses constitutional problems because it utilizes dis-
respectful methods of communication and persuasion. These methods
constitute efforts forcibly to inculcate and to instill rather than to per-
suade through direct, transparent arguments, reasons, or even direct,
transparent emotional appeals.
27
These autonomy-related ideals also find support in Barnette. There,
the Court recognized that "compelling the flag salute and pledge tran-
scends constitutional limitations" on local authorities' police powers and
that such forced patriotism laws invade "the sphere of intellect and spirit
which it is the purpose of the First Amendment ... to reserve from all
official control. 28
Notwithstanding the recognition of these foundational free speech
interests, the nation has repeatedly turned to forced patriotism measures
in response to perceived crises. A discussion of these cycles reveals a
historical pattern in which public officials have perpetuated the mistakes
of the past despite the clear constitutional barriers to the enforcement of
these laws.
II. NATIONAL INSECURITY - THE HISTORICAL CYCLES OF FEAR
As the historian Cecilia Elizabeth O'Leary has written, the tendency
toward nationalism in the United States is a relatively recent phenome-
25. Jed Rubenfeld, The First Amendment's Purpose, 53 STAN. L. REv. 767, 818-21 (2001).
Another element of this interest in silence is maintaining the right to keep one's actual views from
being publicly disclosed. Greene, supra note 22, at 473 ("[Tlhe right not to speak is the right not to
reveal one's mind publicly."). This interest, however, is more likely implicated if one is forced to
express one's own views, rather than those from a government script. Accordingly, this is not an
important justification for invalidating forced speech patriotism laws.
26. TRIBE, supra note 18, at §15-5, at 1317 ("It is hard to take seriously the notion that those
who saw the license plate on the Maynard's car ... actually thought that the driver of the vehicle
endorsed the state's motto... The real problem ... is [that the law] 'invades the sphere of intellect
and spirit."' (quoting Wooley, 430 U.S. at 715)); Blasi & Shiffrin, supra note 15, at 457 ("[Wlhat
underpins Barnette is the First Amendment interest in the speaker's freedom of thought and freedom
of conscience."); Greene, supra note 22, at 480-82 (arguing that compelled speech laws may be
viewed conceptually as violating constitutional rights of personhood and autonomy even if they do
not violate the right of free expression).
27. Blasi & Shiffrin, supra note 15, at 457-58.
28. Barnette, 319 U.S. at 642.
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non.29 Prior to the Civil War, there was much more affinity for regional
and statewide units than for a unified national polity.30 With some nota-
ble exceptions, there were few celebrations of nationalism or icons for
which respect was widely shared. Indeed, there was no National Anthem,
no Pledge of Allegiance, and no celebration of patriotic holidays other
than the Fourth of July. 31 Proponents and opponents of the temperance
movement adopted and parodied The Star-Spangled Banner, whose tune
was borrowed from an old English drinking song.32
Toward the end of the nineteenth century, however, the first wide-
spread efforts of private organizations to instill a sense of nationalism in
American culture emerged. In the 1880s, private patriotic groups began
organized campaigns to fortify nationalist sentiments, including promot-
ing daily recitations of the Pledge of Allegiance and other forms of re-
spect for the flag.3 3 Perhaps sparked by the Spanish-American War, the
first major international conflict in which the United States had engaged
since the war with Mexico, formal and informal efforts to instill patriot-
ism proliferated. Indeed, in 1898, on the day after war on Spain was de-
clared, the New York legislature adopted the first state flag salute law.34
Another factor in this development was the emergence of the first impor-
tant veterans' organization, the Grand Army of the Republic. 35 Also dur-
ing this period, Francis Bellamy wrote the original version of the Pledge
of Allegiance3 6 and pro-flag advocates founded the flag protection
movement, which enjoyed early success.37
Substantial government action to promote patriotism, however, did
not commence until World War 1.38 From World War I through the pre-
sent, there now have been six identifiable cycles of fear generated by
international conflict, threats to national security, or in one case, sheer
29. CECILIA ELIZABETH O'LEARY, To DIE FOR: THE PARADOX OF AMERICAN PATRIOTISM 10
(1999).
30. Id. That is not to say that related issues of nativism, xenophobia, and racism did not exist,
but those issues implicated slightly different concerns from the type of nationalism discussed here.
31. Id. at 3, 20.
32. Id. at 20-21 (noting that the anthem was "popular, but by no means sacred.").
33. Id. at 49.
34. IRONS, supra note 15, at 16. The law imposed a duty on the state school superintendent to
prepare a program providing for flag salutes at the beginning of every school day. DAVID
MANWARING, RENDER UNTO CAESAR: THE FLAG SALUTE CONTROVERSY 3 (1962). Typical of these
earlier flag laws, the New York statute did not formally compel students to participate, but the actual
practice effectively made such laws compulsory. Id. at 4.
35. O'LEARY, supra note 29, at 29-48.
36. Id. at 160-62. Though different interpretations exist as to Bellamy's motivations, there is
at least some historical evidence that he had a financial interest in a flag producing business, and that
the Pledge may have been designed to boost sales. Blasi & Shiffrin, supra note 15, at 434 (citing
sources).
37. ROBERT JUSTIN GOLDSTEIN, FLAG BURNING AND FREE SPEECH 20-21 (2000) [hereinafter,
GOLDSTEN, FLAG BURNING]; O'LEARY, supra note 29, at 232-33.
38. O'LEARY, supra note 29, at 221.
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political will.39 Below, I briefly describe the forced patriotism measures
spawned by each of these cycles.4 °
A. The First Cycle: World War I, Espionage, and the First Red Scare
4 1
As students of First Amendment history are well aware, freedom of
speech first emerged as an important constitutional doctrine during the
period surrounding World War 1.42 At that time, Americans were con-
cerned with a number of different factors associated with the war. There
was strong domestic opposition to the United States's involvement in the
war, spurred in part by an emerging Socialist party that was gaining po-
litical influence.43 At the same time, the United States was concerned
about internal political strife in Russia and initial fears of domestic
Communism began to develop. 44 Coinciding with these events were
trepidations about the increasing immigrant population and the ascen-
dance of the labor movement.45 From these factors arose serious con-
cerns about the loyalty of citizens and other residents, with great suspi-
cion of those who did not support the United States's involvement in the
war.
39. One could reasonably argue that the prevalence of this phenomenon in just ninety years
demonstrates that the United States has been in a continuous state of perceived fear since the begin-
ning of World War 1. As each era can be defined in contrast to other eras and to periods of restraint,
however, I think these recurrences can be fairly labeled as cycles. Moreover, the cycles I refer to are,
with one exception, commonly recognized as relevant markers of civil liberties concerns. See, e.g.,
Tushnet, supra note 10, at 285 (calling references to these periods typical in discussions of civil
liberties and wartime).
40. Another possibility I do not consider here is the symbiotic effect of forced patriotism
laws. It may be that such laws foster periods of fear, as well as respond to them. I am grateful to Ann
Scales for suggesting this perspective to me. See generally DAVID I. KERTZER, RITUAL, POLITICS,
AND POWER (1988) (describing the role of political ritual and symbolism in constructing actual
political environments).
41. Two other historical periods in which one might examine civil liberties deprivations
resulting from nationalistic concerns are the beginning of the nineteenth century, when the Sedition
Act was, briefly, in place, see Law of July 14, 1798, ch. 73, 1 Stat. 596 (expired 1801), and the Civil
War, when President Lincoln attempted to suspend the writ of habeas corpus, see REHNQUIST, supra
note 10, at 24-25, and the federal government imposed loyalty oath requirements. HAROLD HYMAN,
THE ERA OF THE OATH 41-47 (1978). I do not discuss them here because they did not arise in the
context of serious threats external to the United States, a theme that connects most of the cycles I
discuss. Congress arguably enacted the Sedition Act for internal political purposes, though there was
ostensibly concern about threats from France. Lewis, supra note 10, at 264-65. The Civil War in-
volved an internal security threat, not one generated by another nation. It is true that during Recon-
struction, the federal government imposed loyalty oath requirements on southern citizens, particu-
larly Confederate prisoners. HYMAN, supra. While loyalty oaths always may suggest concerns about
forced patriotism, given the level of domestic strife following the conclusion of the war, these oaths
can be viewed more as an instrumental tool for enhancing stability than as a purely symbolic gesture
of nationalism. In any event, it can be argued that the same sense of nationalism and devotion to
icons strongly associated with forced patriotism laws was not prevalent during either of these peri-
ods.
42. See generally ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 969-83 (2001).
43. See GOLDSTEIN, POLITICAL REPRESSION, supra note 15, at 105-08.
44. Tushnet, supra note 10, at 285.
45. O'LEARY, supra note 29, at 220-26.
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Throughout this period, private organizations and individuals con-
tinued their efforts to encourage a sense of nationalism. 46 Groups such as
the Boy Scouts jumped on the patriotism bandwagon.47 Individuals car-
ried out acts of vigilantism, many of them violent, against persons per-
ceived to be disloyal.48 At the same time, patriotic songs, including the
absurdly mindless My Country Right or Wrong, increased in popularity.
49
In 1919, following the war's conclusion, the American Legion began a





In addition to these private movements, the state began to actively
involve itself in influencing patriotic ideals during this era. For instance,
the federal government tried to influence public feelings of loyalty
through propaganda campaigns led by the Committee on Public Informa-
tion.5' As Professor O'Leary observes: "The government became an ac-
tive participant and catalyst in mobilizing the patriotic movement and in
promoting a particularly intolerant and authoritarian brand of patriot-
iM,152ism.
' 2
More direct measures to chill disloyal speech became prevalent.
Much has been written about the wave of prosecutions under the federal
Espionage Act of 1917 and the subsequent ascendance of First Amend-
ment doctrine. While many of these cases involved charges that indi-
viduals actually interfered with the United States war effort or under-
mined the military draft, thus putatively addressing tangible security in-
terests, federal law also contained more overt forced patriotism meas-
ures. The Sedition Act, for example, forbade any person to utter, print,
write, or publish any disloyal, profane, scurrilous, or abusive language
intended to cause contempt or scorn for the form of government of the
United States, the Constitution, or the flag. 53 In some anti-sedition cases
during this period, the courts described the danger of the prohibited mes-
sages in terms of their non-patriotic qualities.54
Forced patriotism measures at the state and local level also began to
show up during this period. Although numerous states already had flag
46. Other commentators have also associated this period with the rise of militarism and mas-
culinism in American culture. See O'LEARY, supra note 29, at 227-32. See generally Ann Scales,
Militarism, Male Dominance and Law: Feminist Jurisprudence as Oxymoron?, 12 HARV. WOMEN'S
L.J. 25 (1989).
47. O'LEARY, supra note 29, at 222-36.
48. Id. at 235.
49. Id. at 227.
50. See IRONS, supra note 15, at 16.
51. O'LEARY, supra note 29, at 229.
52. Id. at 221.
53. Act of May 16, 1918, ch. 75, § 1, 40 Stat. 553.
54. See, e.g., Masses Pub. Co. v. Patten, 246 Fed. 24, 36-37 (2d Cir. 1917) (describing politi-
cal cartoon as punishable because "[ilts voice is not the voice of patriotism, and its language sug-
gests disloyalty").
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desecration laws in place by the beginning of World War I,55 many states
increased the criminal penalties for desecration.56 Texas broadened the
language of its flag desecration law to punish those who publicly, or
even privately, used language that cast contempt on the flag. 7 In 1918, a
Montana man was convicted and sentenced to twenty years of hard labor
when he refused to kiss an American flag and verbalized his opposition
to doing so.
58
Public laws governing flag salutes in schools during this period
were also stricter. Organizations ranging from the American Legion to
the Ku Klux Klan pushed these laws in conjunction with a broader patri-
otism movement. 59 The laws did not necessarily compel students to recite
the Pledge, but compulsion was understood as a condition of educational
culture.60 The laws did, however, impose legal duties on teachers or other
school officers to lead the Pledge of Allegiance or be subject to dismissal
or criminal punishment. 6' As one commentator noted:
The changed temper reflected in these later laws is striking. Unlike
the earlier statutes, which represented nothing more than benevolent
meddling with the curriculum, they evidence strong legislative fears
that without the stringent application of rewards and punishments,
many teachers would not seek to inculcate loyalty and patriotism in
their charges at all.6
2
Governmental command for respect and loyalty during this era is
emblematic of the fundamental dangers of forced patriotism. The Sedi-
tion Act, for example, implicated free speech concerns by demanding
loyalty through silence. Similarly, flag desecration laws forbade public
and, in some cases, private acts of disrespect toward a national icon. The
government's objective underlying these measures, as in forced speech
laws, was formal unity; the absence of dissent falsely implied a unified
polity.
B. The Second Cycle: World War II and Pearl Harbor
Most Americans are probably more familiar with the civil liberties
issues emerging from the period surrounding the Second World War than
55. ROBERT GOLDSTEIN, BURNING THE FLAG: THE GREAT 1989-90 AMERICAN FLAG
DESECRATION CONTROVERSY 5 (1996) [hereinafter, GOLDSTEIN, FLAG CONTROVERSY].
56. O'LEARY, supra note 29, at 234. There was some ambivalence about the application of
flag desecration laws to commercial and political campaign use, though the main application of laws
during this era was toward dissidents and immigrants. Id. But see Halter v. Nebraska, 205 U.S. 34
(1907) (upholding law restricting commercial use of flag as applied to company selling "Stars and
Stripes" beer depicting images of American flags).
57. O'LEARY, supra note 29, at 234-35.
58. Id. at 236.
59. IRONS, supra note 15, at 16.
60. MANWARING, supra note 34, at 3-4.
61. Id. at4.
62. Id. at 3-4.
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in any other era. The focal point, of course, is the internment of Japanese
American citizens upheld by the Supreme Court in Korematsu v. United
States.63 Although the military's exclusion order at issue in that case was
clearly not a forced patriotism measure because it was more instrumental
than symbolic, loyalty was a central rhetorical focal point of the Court's
analysis.64 In disputing military officials' claims of legitimate national
security concerns, Justice Murphy's dissent cited the congressional tes-
timony of General DeWitt justifying the order.65 The tenor of DeWitt's
remarks illustrates a focus on the patriotism of American citizens and
surely contributed to an atmosphere of fear.
There is no way to determine their loyalty .... The danger of the
Japanese was, and is now - if they are permitted to come back - es-
pionage and sabotage. It makes no difference whether he is an
American citizen, he is still a Japanese. American citizenship does
not necessarily determine loyalty .... But we must worry about the
Japanese all the time until he is wiped off the map.66
Moreover, Justice Murphy's dissent pointed out that government of-
ficials relied upon evidence that some Japanese Americans residing in
the United States continued to practice Japanese cultural customs relating
to iconic representations and ceremonies, though there was no nexus
between such activities and the loyalty of those engaged in them.67
The connection between patriotism and the participation or non-
participation in ritualistic exercises of loyalty, however, preceded the
Japanese internment. Even before the formal involvement of the United
States in the war, concerns about patriotism were embedded in the na-
tional consciousness. The Supreme Court decided the first flag salute
case, Minersville School District v. Gobitis,68 in 1940, just as the poten-
tial of United States involvement in the war was growing stronger. In
that case, children adhering to the Jehovah's Witness faith objected to
their expulsion for failure to obey a school board regulation requiring all
schoolchildren to salute the flag and recite the Pledge of Allegiance.69
Because their religious faith forbade them to engage in worship of
graven images, they claimed that the regulation interfered with both their
63. 323 U.S. 214 (1944).
64. Korematsu, 323 U.S. at 218-19 (noting that the exclusion order "was deemed necessary
because of the presence of an unascertained number of disloyal members of the group, most of
whom we have no doubt were loyal to this country"); and id. at 223-24 ("There was evidence of
disloyalty on the part of some, the military authorities considered that the need for action was great,
and time was short.").
65. Id. at 236 n.2 (Murphy, J., dissenting).
66. Id. (quoting testimony of LA. General DeWitt before the House Naval Affairs Subcommit-
tee to Investigate Congested Areas (emphasis added)).
67. Id. at 237, 237 n.5 (Murphy, J., dissenting) (arguing that participation in "emperor wor-
shipping ceremonies" was not correlated with disloyalty).
68. 310 U.S. 586 (1940), overruled by W. Va. Bd. of Educ. v. Bamette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943).
69. Gobitis, 310 U.S. at 591.
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right of free speech and their right of free exercise of religion under the
First Amendment. 70 While recognizing that the government may not in-
terfere with expressions of belief or disbelief, the Court upheld the
school's regulation, concluding that the state has a legitimate interest in
maintaining security through mandatory ceremonial acts. 71 Justice Frank-
furter's majority opinion strongly endorsed the state's claimed interests.
He wrote that "[a] society which is dedicated to the preservation of these
ultimate values of civilization may in self-protection utilize the educa-
tional process for inculcating those almost unconscious feelings which
bind men together in a comprehending loyalty, whatever may be their
lesser differences and difficulties.
'7 2
In one of the ugliest periods of our nation's history, Gobitis led to
widespread acts of private violence against Jehovah's Witnesses
throughout the United States. The Department of Justice reported hun-
dreds of attacks on Jehovah's Witnesses within two weeks of the Gobitis
decision.73 In one incident, a Witness hall of worship was burned.74 In
West Virginia, law enforcement officers forced a group of Witnesses to
drink castor oil and then tied them together and marched them through
the streets.75 Vigilantes in Nebraska abducted a Witness and beat and
castrated him.
76
Gobitis was decided in 1940, a year and a half before the Japanese
invasion of Pearl Harbor. Shortly after the Pearl Harbor attack, and the
United States's formal entry into World War II, measures directed at
patriotism and loyalty proliferated. In 1942, Congress enacted the federal
Pledge of Allegiance statute. While not mandating the Pledge, the federal
law codified the language of the Pledge and advised that it should be
recited while standing at attention with the right hand over the heart.77
70. Id. at 591-93.
71. Id. at 593,600.
72. Id. at 600. In contrast, Justice Stone's dissent observed that the uniformity sought by such
laws was not likely to be accomplished by state compulsion:
[WIhile such expressions of loyalty, when voluntarily given, may promote national unity,
it is quite another matter to say that their compulsory expression by children in violation
of their own and their parents' religious convictions can be regarded as playing so impor-
tant a part in our national unity as to leave school boards free to exact it despite the con-
stitutional guarantee of freedom of religion.
Id. at 605 (Stone, J., dissenting) (emphasis added). Justice Stone also noted the free speech implica-
tions of such laws. Id.; see also Colin Bessonette, Q & A, THE ATLANTA JOURNAL-CONSTITUTION,
June 30, 2002 at 2C ("Pledges of allegiance are marks of totalitarian states, not democracies, ... I
can't think of a single democracy except the United States that has a pledge of allegiance." (quoting
anthropologist David Kertzer)).
73. IRONS, supra note 15, at 22-23; MANWARING, supra note 34, at 163-66. At least one
scholar has disputed whether the wave of violence can be attributed entirely to Gobitis, though he
concedes that the persecution was probably broader and more intense as a result of the Court's
decision. MANWARING, supra note 34, at 163.
74. IRONS, supra note 15, at 23; MANWARING, supra note 34, at 164-65.
75. IRONS, supra note 15, at 23.
76. Id.
77. 4 U.S.C. § 4 (2002).
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In West Virginia, about a month after the Pearl Harbor attack, the
state board of education adopted a regulation requiring all teachers and
pupils to participate in a salute honoring the nation as represented by the
flag and recite the Pledge of Allegiance.78 Failure to comply would be
treated as insubordination. 79 The connection between mandated loyalty
and national security was manifest in the Board's resolution, which ex-
pressed its sentiment that:
[N]ational unity is the basis of national security; that the flag of our
Nation is the symbol of our National Unity transcending all internal
differences, however large within the framework of the Constitution;
that the Flag is the symbol of the Nation's power; that emblem of
freedom in its truest, best sense; that it signifies government resting
on the consent of the governed, liberty regulated by law, protection
of the weak against the strong, security against the exercise of arbi-
trary power, and absolute safety for free institutions against foreign
aggression.
80
Notwithstanding the strong national feelings sympathetic to this
type of statement, the Supreme Court overruled Gobitis in West Virginia
Board of Education v. Barnette and invalidated the school board's regu-
lation.81 The Court's opinion expressed an unequivocal commitment to
invalidating forced speech patriotism measures as a fundamental viola-
tion of the freedom of conscience and speech.82
C. The Third Cycle: McCarthyism and the House Un-American Activities
Committee
Despite a short respite from major civil liberties concerns coincid-
ing with the end of World War 11,83 by 1947 a new cycle of forced patri-
otism emerged as the Cold War began and public officials began to fear
Communist infiltration into government agencies.84 The renewed sense
of urgency about loyalty and patriotism was symbolized by the activities
of the House Un-American Activities Committee ("HUAC"), which was
created in 1938, but converted to a standing committee in 1945.85 The
activities of HUAC in the late 1940s and the emergence of Senator Jo-
seph McCarthy as a leader of anti-subversive hysteria in 1950, coincid-
ing with the onset of the Korean War, led to numerous threats to civil
liberties.86
78. Barnette, 319 U.S. at 625-27.
79. Id. at 626.
80. Id. at 626 n.2 (quoting Board resolution).
81. Id. at 642.
82. For other examples of state laws promoting forced patriotism, see GOLDSTEIN, POLITICAL
REPRESSION, supra note 15, at 282-83 (describing sedition laws of Mississippi and Louisiana).
83. Id. at 287-88.
84. Id. at 289-98.
85. Id. at 240, 292.
86. See generally id. at 292-396.
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Many of these efforts were instrumental, rather than symbolic, such
as the widely reported efforts of congressional leaders in conducting in-
vestigative hearings to root out Communist subversion and the prosecu-
tion of Communist leaders under laws such as the Smith Act. But more
general concerns about patriotism also manifested themselves in a wide
range of federal and state laws requiring certain classes of persons to
recite loyalty oaths, usually as a condition of government employment.
87
Because of their breadth and generality, loyalty oaths for public employ-
ees, though not targeted at the general population, fit within the defini-
tion of forced patriotism.
First Amendment doctrine pertaining to loyalty oaths is a mixed
bag. While a number of Supreme Court decisions uphold some types of
loyalty oaths for public employees, the Court has limited the application
of such laws to persons who were actively affiliated with an organization
that advocated unlawful activity, who knew about those objectives, and
who specifically intended to further those unlawful goals.88 In other
words, the Court itself appears to recognize a constitutional distinction
between loyalty oaths that address specific threats to security and the
open-ended compulsion of fealty pledges. Toward the end of this cycle,
the Court also invalidated some loyalty oath provisions under the doc-
trines of vagueness and overbreadth.89
In addition to the specific focus on loyalty symbolized by congres-
sional investigations and loyalty oath statutes, Congress amended the
federal law defining the Pledge of Allegiance to add the words "under
God" during this cycle.90 Spurred by the efforts of the Knights of Co-
lumbus, a private fraternal organization, Congress adopted the revision at
least in part "to distinguish the American system of government from
87. Id. at 298-305, 348-60.
88. Compare, e.g., Adler v. Bd. of Educ. of New York, 342 U.S. 485, 496 (1952) (upholding
law prohibiting employment in public schools of persons who advocated the overthrow of the gov-
ernment by force or violence), overruled in part by Keyishian v. Bd. of Regents, 385 U.S. 589, 605-
06 (1967), with Wieman v. Updegraff, 344 U.S. 183, 190 (1952) (invalidating law requiring public
employees to take oath swearing that they were not members of the Communist Party or any group
that advocated violent overthrow of the government). The scope of First Amendment law in this area
is also complicated by the subsequent adoption of a stringent test limiting the government's authority
to punish advocacy of unlawful conduct. See Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969) (limit-
ing punishment of subversive advocacy unless the "advocacy is directed to inciting or producing
imminent lawless action and is likely to incite or produce such action").
89. See, e.g., Baggett v. Bullitt, 377 U.S. 360, 366-70 (1964) (invalidating loyalty oath provi-
sions for public university employees as unconstitutionally vague); Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479,
487-88 (1960) (invalidating state law requiring teachers to provide information about organizational
memberships as unconstitutionally overbroad). The relevance of loyalty oaths has not diminished for
some public employees, though it is no longer an issue that sits in the limelight. See Gabriel J. Chin
& Saira Rao, Pledging Allegiance to the Constitution: The First Amendment and Loyalty Oaths for
Faculty at Private Universities, 64 U. Prrr. L. REV. 431 (2003).
90. Pub. L. No. 396, 68 Stat. 249 (1954).
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communism and to underscore the commitment to inalienable, individual
rights guaranteed by God."
91
D. The Fourth Cycle: The Vietnam War
As Cold War fears of creeping Communism extended into southeast
Asia, the United States's military involvement in Vietnam became the
focal point of the next cycle of forced patriotism measures. The political
divisions within the nation over this issue generated substantial domestic
conflict, and fears about the lack of unity spawned efforts to silence dis-
loyal speakers. Not surprisingly, during this period government officials
actively prosecuted cases against protestors for mistreatment of the
United States flag.92 Indeed, one commentator has argued that "[t]he flag
... became the greatest single symbol of the cultural and political divide
that ripped the country apart during the Vietnam War.,
9 3
The Court addressed the constitutionality of flag desecration prose-
cutions in three important cases during this cycle. In the first case, Street
v. New York,9 4 the Court reviewed a man's conviction for flag desecra-
tion. After the murder of civil rights leader James Meredith, the defen-
dant went into public, burned a United States flag, and said "If they let
that happen to Meredith we don't need an American flag.",95 The Court
concluded that New York's desecration law was so broad that it allowed
Street to be convicted based only on his words, and that the law was
therefore unconstitutional as applied to his conduct.96 It did not, at that
time, hold that flag burning itself was constitutionally protected. In fact,
the Street decision came just a year after Congress passed a federal flag
desecration law.97
A few years later, the Court decided Spence v. Washington98 and
Smith v. Goguen.99 In Spence, the Court invalidated the conviction of a
man who was prosecuted for "improper use" of a flag when he displayed
an upside down U.S. flag on which he had formed a peace symbol with
black tape. °° In Smith, the Court struck down a state law prohibiting
91. Blasi & Shiffrin, supra note 15, at 471 (citing legislative history).
92. An influential law review article concerning punishment of conduct toward the flag also
appeared during this period. See John Hart Ely, Flag Desecration: A Case Study in the Roles of
Categorization and Balancing in First Amendment Analysis, 88 HARV. L. REV. 1482 (1975). Also
during this cycle, the Court upheld the conviction of a man who publicly burned his draft registration
card in protest of the United States's involvement in the Vietnam War. See United States v. O'Brien,
391 U.S. 367, 386 (1968). Although this case could be placed into the matrix of forced patriotism
cases, it focused more specifically on the elusive speech-conduct distinction. O'Brien, 391 U.S. at
376-77.
93. GOLDSTEIN, FLAG CONTROVERSY, supra note 55, at 12.
94. 394 U.S. 576 (1969).
95. Street, 394 U.S. at 578.
96. Id. at 581.
97. GOLDSTEiN, FLAG CONTROVERSY, supra note 55, at 13.
98. 418 U.S. 405 (1974).
99. 415 U.S. 566 (1974).
100. Spence, 418 U.S. at 415.
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contemptuous treatment of the American flag as unconstitutionally
vague.' ° 1 The state had attempted to enforce the law against a man who
wore a flag patch on the seat of his blue jeans.'
02
The Court decided this trilogy of forced patriotism cases on fairly
narrow grounds, but did broach the broader subject of the state's power
to control loyalty. In Street, for example, the Court relied on Barnette in
stating that the First Amendment encompasses "the freedom to express
publicly one's opinions about our flag, including those opinions which
are defiant or contemptuous. '0 3 In Spence, however, the Court refused to
directly address whether the state has a legitimate interest in preserving
the integrity of the United States flag. 1 4 While recognizing that the state
may not punish people for failing to show respect for the flag, the Court
hinted that it might give weight to the state's interests in future cases
when it acknowledged that if the flag "may be destroyed or permanently
disfigured, it could be argued that it will lose its capability of mirroring
the sentiments of all who view it.""°5 In his dissent, then-Associate Jus-
tice Rehnquist argued that the majority failed to give appropriate
recognition to the state's interest in preserving the flag as a symbol of
nationhood and unity. 0 6 He distinguished the flag misuse law from flag
salute requirements, arguing that the former does not demand
allegiance. 10 7 He expressed similar sentiments in his dissent in Smith.1
0 8
E. The Fifth (?) Cycle: The 1988 Presidential Election and the Flag
Burning Cases
During the late 1980s, the United States was not at war, and no real
or perceived external national security threats of any significant dimen-
sion existed.1' 9 Yet, in the heat of the 1988 presidential campaign, Vice
101. Smith, 415 U.S. at 567-68.
102. Id. at 568.
103. Street, 394 U.S. at 593.
104. Spence, 418 U.S. at 413-14.
105. Id. at 412-13.
106. Id. at 421 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
107. Id. at 422 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
108. Smith, 415 U.S. at 601-04 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). At the state and local level during
this cycle, the prevalence of "red squads" investigating subversive political activities suggested a
widespread government distrust of American citizens. GOLDSTEIN, FLAG CONTROVERSY, supra note
55, at 504-09. These squads were notorious for engaging in surveillance of political activists and
maintaining investigative files on numerous citizens engaged in ordinary (and constitutionally pro-
tected) political activism. Id. As these efforts were at least nominally instrumental, however, I do not
include them in the category of forced patriotism.
109. No period of American history, of course, is without any conflict. During this period
violence in the Middle East continued, and United States troops engaged in fleeting involvement in
Grenada and Panama. Once and Future Veterans, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 12, 1990, at A18 (noting that
more than 230,000 U.S. troops were currently serving in the Persian Gulf; in 1989 27,000 troops had
invaded Panama,; and in 1983 8,000 troops went to Grenada). And though Cold War tensions per-
sisted through President Reagan's two terms in office, they largely dissipated with the fall of the
Berlin Wall. See Harold Hongju Koh, On American Exceptionalism, 55 STAN. L. REV. 1479, 1496
(2003) (quoting JOHN LEWIS GADDIS, AND Now THIS, LESSONS FROM THE OLD ERA FOR THE NEW
ONE, IN THE AGE OF TERROR: AMERICA AND THE WORLD AFTER SEPTEMBER 11, at I (Strobe Tal-
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President George H.W. Bush and his political advisors successfully
manufactured a major patriotism issue to attack his Democratic oppo-
nent, Massachusetts Governor Michael Dukakis.' 1" 0 Insofar as is discerni-
ble, this cycle is the only example of a period of patriotic hysteria that
was artificially produced entirely for partisan purposes.
Bush chose to highlight Dukakis's veto of a Massachusetts law that
would have required public schoolteachers to lead students in the daily
recitation of the Pledge of Allegiance. 11 Little if any notice was given to
the fact that Dukakis had vetoed the law in response to an advisory opin-
ion from the highest court in Massachusetts 1 2 and the advice of the Mas-
sachusetts attorney general that the measure was patently unconstitu-
tional under Barnette. t3 Indeed, a Republican governor of Massachusetts
had vetoed essentially the same law just six years before Dukakis did."
14
Bush also made much of Dukakis's admission that he was a card-
carrying member of the ACLU and promoted his own candidacy with a
high profile visit to an American flag factory.' '5 Bush successfully made
doubts about Dukakis's loyalty a centerpiece of his campaign, which had
trailed in public opinion polls before he introduced the patriotism is-
sue."16
Perhaps not coincidentally, less than a month before the 1988 presi-
dential election, the Supreme Court agreed to hear Texas v. Johnson, a
flag burning protestor's constitutional challenge to his conviction under a
state flag desecration statute." 7 At the end of that term, well after Bush's
election, the Court invalidated the Texas law as a viewpoint discrimina-
tory regulation that violated the First Amendment." 8 In doing so, the
Court recognized that while the state has a legitimate interest in preserv-
ing the flag as a symbol of the nation, it cannot advance that interest in a
manner that favors respectful treatment and disfavors treatment that con-
veys opposition to the government's view." 19
bott & Nayan Chanda eds., 2001)); Peter J. Schraeder, Cold War to Cold Peace: Explaining
U.S.-French Competition in Francophone Africa, POL. SCIENCE Q., Sept. 22, 2000, at 395.
110. GOLDSTEIN, FLAG CONTROVERSY, supra note 55, at 73-76. That this cycle was artificially
created is supported by the fact that this is not one of the periods regularly incorporated into discus-
sions of wartime civil liberties. See, e.g., REHNQUIST, supra note 10; Cole, supra note 10; Tushnet,
supra note 10.
111. GOLDSTEIN, FLAG CONTROVERSY, supra note 55, at 73-74.
112. Opinions of the Justices to the Governor, 372 Mass. 874, 878-79, 363 N.E.2d 251, 254
(Mass. 1977).
113. GOLDSTEIN, FLAG CONTROVERSY, supra note 55, at 74.
114. Id.
115. Id. at 75; Robert D. Richards & Clay Calvert, Nadine Strossen and Freedom of Expres-
sion: A Dialogue with the ACLU's Top Card-Carrying Member, 13 GEO. MASON U. CIV. RTS. L.J.
185, 185-86 (2003).
116. GOLDSTEIN, FLAG CONTROVERSY, supra note 55, at 74.
117. 488 U.S. 907 (1988) (order granting writ of certiorari on Oct. 17, 1988).
118. Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397 (1989).
119. Johnson, 491 U.S. at 412-13, 418.
2004]
DENVER UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
The Court's sharply divided opinion in Johnson was met with ex-
traordinary hostility.120 Opponents called for a constitutional amendment
to establish a flag burning exception to the First Amendment, a move-
ment that was somewhat mollified by Congress's enactment of the fed-
eral Flag Protection Act. 12 In that law, Congress attempted to avoid the
constitutional infirmities of the Texas flag law by prohibiting public de-
struction of the flag for any reason, rather than only in circumstances that
would likely offend others.12 2 In its next term, however, the Court also
invalidated the new federal flag law. 123 In United States v. Eichman, the
Court inferred that the government's only purpose for prohibiting the
public desecration of a privately-owned flag could be to preserve the flag
as a national symbol, an overtly content-based justification. 24 Thus, in
both Johnson and Eichman, the Court repudiated the idea that the gov-
ernment could compel respectful treatment of the flag by punishing acts
that destroyed the flag. 25 In this manner, the cases represented the
strongest rebuke of forced patriotism since Barnette.
Another incident that fueled the patriotism controversy during this
period was a well-publicized dispute over a display created by art student
"Dread" Scott Tyler. 2 6 While Johnson was pending in the Court, Tyler
created an installation for a juried art exhibition of minority students'
work at the School of the Art Institute in Chicago. 127 The installation
displayed the exhibit's title, What Is the Proper Way to Display the
American Flag?, posted on the wall along with provocative photographs,
including a picture of South Korean demonstrators burning an American
flag and images of flag-draped coffins. 28 Beneath the wall display was a
platform holding a book in which viewers could write their own feelings
about the flag, while spread out on the floor underneath the platform was
an actual American flag. 129 Some people claimed that viewers had to step
on the flag in order to write their thoughts in the book, though it was
possible to reach the book from the side without stepping on the flag.
130
Tyler's display inflamed public opinion and generated widespread
condemnation and national media attention. Individuals tried to physi-
cally remove the flag from the exhibit. 131 The art school and its officials
were the subject of bomb scares and death threats. 32 A group of veterans
120. GOLDSTEIN, FLAG CONTROVERSY, supra note 55, at 113-56.
121. Id. at 189-230.
122. United States v. Eichman, 496 U.S. 310, 315 (1990).
123. Eichman, 496 U.S. at 318.
124. Id. at 315-16.
125. Id. at 318; Johnson, 491 U.S. at 415-16.
126. See GOLDSTEIN, FLAG CONTROVERSY, supra note 55, at 77-88.
127. Id. at 77.
128. Id.
129. Id.





filed an unsuccessful lawsuit attempting to ban the exhibit. 133 Many pro-
tests targeting the exhibit were held, culminating with two demonstra-
tions involving thousands of people, mostly veterans, marching on the
school and the Art Institute of Chicago.134 Lawmakers at the federal,
state, and local level responded by adopting or amending flag desecration
laws to specifically forbid the display of flags on the ground. 135 The Illi-
nois legislature terminated public funding for the art school.
136
The synergy of these multiple episodes regarding patriotism and
loyalty shaped an intense public discourse for several years. Johnson and
Eichman spawned early efforts to amend the Constitution to exempt flag
burning from First Amendment protection, efforts that continue, albeit
with less fervor, to this day. 137 Despite the intensity of this cycle, serious
and widespread efforts to mandate patriotism did not again arise until
after the tragic events of September 11, 2001.
III. FORCED PATRIOTISM AND SEPTEMBER 1 1TH
In the time since the September 1 th terrorist attacks, fifteen states
and many local governments have either adopted laws in some way re-
quiring the regular recitation of the Pledge of Allegiance by schoolchil-
dren or modified their existing laws regarding the Pledge. 38 Most, if not
all, of this resurgence in legislative interest in forced Pledge require-
ments can be attributed directly to public officials' desire to respond in
some way to new threats to national security and the aspiration for na-
tional unity. 139 The New York City Board of Education, for example,
133. Id.
134. Id. at 81-82.
135. Id. at 85-86. The Chicago ordinance was quickly enjoined by a state court in a suit by a
group of artists including Tyler. Aubin v. City of Chicago, No. 89 CH 8763 (Cook Co. Cir. Ct.).
136. See GOLDSTEIN, FLAG CONTROVERSY, supra note 55, at 78.
137. See generally id.; e.g., Flag Protection Act of 2004, S. 516, 108th Cong.; Flag Protection
Act of 2003, H.R. 2162, 108th Cong.; H. Con. Res. 51, 108th Cong. (2003) (expressing the sense of
Congress that Congress should have the power to prohibit desecration of the flag); H.J. Res. 4, 108th
Cong. (2003) (proposing an amendment to the Constitution authorizing Congress and the States to
prohibit the act of desecration of the flag); S.J. Res. 4, 108th Cong. (2003) (same). At least one state
has followed suit. See H.B. 2694, 46th Leg., 2d Reg. Sess. (Az. 2004) (outlawing flag burning with
intent to intimidate any person or group of persons).
138. See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. § 22-1-106(2); 24 PENN. STAT. § 7-771; FLA. STAT. ANN. §
1003.44 (2004); Mo. REV. STAT. § 171.021 (Vernons 2004); TEX. EDUC. CODE ANN. § 25.082
(Vernons 2004). But see OHIO REV. CODE § 3316.602 (adding provision indicating that policies
adopted under Pledge provision shall not require students to participate in recitation of the Pledge,
and protecting such students from intimidation aimed at coercing participation).
139. It is possible, of course, that some of this resurgence was a reaction to the Ninth Circuit's
decision in Newdow v. U.S. Congress, 292 F.3d 597 (9th Cir. 2002), rev'd, 124 S. Ct. 2301 (2004)
(dismissing case for lack of standing). In that case, the court of appeals held that all recitations of the
Pledge in public schools violated the First Amendment's Establishment Clause because of its inclu-
sion of the words, "under God." Newdow, 292 F.3d at 612. The Newdow case itself was filed before
September I1, 2001, but the Ninth Circuit's decision declaring the California law to be unconstitu-
tional was issued on June 26, 2002. To the extent state Pledge laws were enacted after September
11th but prior to the Ninth Circuit's Newdow decision, they can fairly be said to have responded to
the attacks. After the Newdow decision, it is difficult to determine which factor, or if both factors,
contributed to the proliferation of Pledge laws.
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specifically referred to the September 1 th attacks in its resolution estab-
lishing a forced Pledge requirement. 140 Perhaps it is still too close to this
period to examine it in context, but preliminary signs indicate that a sixth
forced patriotism cycle is emerging.
The most extreme of these laws was enacted by the State of Colo-
rado. 14' Colorado imposed a mandatory requirement for both students
and teachers in public schools to "recite aloud" the Pledge on a daily
basis.142 Under the law, a student could be excused from reciting the
Pledge, but only if his or her parents first submitted a written note to the
school's principal asserting the objection and, implicitly, explaining the
grounds for that objection. 43 The law exempted teachers who had reli-
gious objections or who were non-citizens, but compelled teachers with
other objections of personal conscience to recite the Pledge.' 44 Thus,
neither teachers nor students (by themselves) could refrain from reciting
the Pledge by asserting their own political or other non-religious scruples
or beliefs.
Shortly after the Colorado law became effective, several students
and teachers filed a lawsuit challenging its constitutionality. A federal
district court judge issued a temporary restraining order forbidding the
state and the defendant school districts from enforcing the law. 145 In its
ruling, the district court found that Barnette created a bright-line First
Amendment rule against government compulsion of the Pledge for stu-
dents, teachers, administrators, and, indeed, any citizens."46 The court
also determined that the law was overtly viewpoint discriminatory in two
distinct ways. First, it discriminated between those who chose to recite
the Pledge and those who did not wish to recite it.147 Second, it discrimi-
nated between students and teachers by permitting different legal
140. State Bd. of Educ. Res. (N.Y. Oct. 17, 2001), available at http://www.nycenet.
edu/secretary/calendar/10-17-01/calendar.htm#20; see also Edward Wyatt, Board Votes to Require
Recitation of Pledge at Public Schools, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 18, 2001, at Dl.
141. See COLO. REV. STAT. § 22-1-106(2).
142. Id.
143. Id.
144. Id. Barnette can be read to establish a First Amendment right for teachers as well as
students to refrain from reciting the Pledge, though it does not address the issue explicitly. Several
lower court opinions have, however, applied Barnette's protections to schoolteachers. See, e.g.,
Russo v. Central Sch. Dist. No. 1, 469 F.2d 623, 630-33 (2d Cir. 1972); Hanover v. Northrop, 325 F.
Supp. 170, 172-73 (D. Conn. 1970); Opinions of the Justices to the Governor, 372 Mass. 874,
878-79, 363 N.E.2d 251, 254 (Mass. 1977); State v. Lundquist, 262 Md. 534, 553-55, 273 A.2d 263,
273-74 (Md. 1971); accord Cary v. Bd. of Educ. of Adams-Arapahoe Sch. Dist., 598 F.2d 535, 541
(10th Cir. 1979) (recognizing that Barnette distinguished between legitimate curriculum require-
ments and mandatory recitation of the Pledge). But see Palmer v. Bd. of Educ., 603 F.2d 1271, 1274
(7th Cir. 1979) (holding that probationary public school teacher did not have constitutional right to
refuse to participate in the Pledge of Allegiance, the singing of patriotic songs, and the celebration of
national holidays). For a commentary on this issue, see Laurie Allen Gallancy, Comment, Teachers
and the Pledge of Allegiance, 57 U. CHI. L. REV. 929 (1990).
145. Lane v. Owens, Civil Action No. 03-B-1544 (PAC) (D. Colo.).
146. Transcript of Ruling 4-5, Lane v. Owens, Civil Action No. 03-B-1544 (PAC), D. Colo.
(copy on file with author) [hereinafter, Transcript].
147. Id. at 9.
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grounds for refusing to recite the Pledge. 148 In rejecting an argument by
some defendant school boards that they had adopted policies to alleviate
the burden on non-consenting students, the court observed that Colo-
rado's law placed a direct legal burden on the students and teachers, in-
dependent of whatever policies local schools had in place. 149 Finally, the
court rejected all government claims that the Pledge requirement served
any legitimate curricular goals. "Pure rote recitation of a pledge such as
this every day of the school year for one's tenure and matriculation
through the school system," the court stated, "cannot be said to be rea-
sonable or legitimate in a pedagogical sense."'
150
In Pennsylvania, the state legislature adopted a Pledge law requiring
officials at both public and private schools to provide for either the reci-
tation of the Pledge of Allegiance or the singing of the National Anthem
at the outset of each school day. 15' The statute allowed students to de-
cline to recite the Pledge or salute the flag if they had religious or other
personal objections to doing so, but required school officials to report
such refusal in writing to an objecting student's parents.152 In a lawsuit
challenging the constitutionality of the Pennsylvania law, a federal dis-
trict court held that the law's exemptions made it non-compulsory, and
therefore in compliance with Barnette.153 Nonetheless, the court held that
the provision requiring schools to notify parents of their children's objec-
tions to reciting the Pledge constituted discriminatory treatment of chil-
dren based on their viewpoints, and was therefore unconstitutional. 54
Though this provision did not impose direct penalties on students who
objected, the court concluded that the "parental notification provision...
offers a disincentive for students to opt out of reciting the Pledge or the
Anthem and thus it coerces students into reciting a state-sponsored mes-
sage.
155
Although not all of the post-September llth Pledge laws were as
extreme as Colorado's or Pennsylvania's, the proliferation of these regu-
lations has generated a renewed atmosphere of forced patriotism. Some
lawmakers may have drafted the laws in an attempt to avoid constitu-
tional problems, but it is not altogether clear their efforts are sufficient.
148. Id.
149. Id. at 10-11.
150. Id. at 11. In response to the lawsuit and restraining order, Colorado has repealed the part
of the law imposing an obligation to recite the Pledge on students and teachers, and instead requires
schools to provide an opportunity for "willing students" to recite it. See CoLO. REV. STAT. § 22-1-
106(3).
151. 24 PENN. STAT. § 7-771.
152. Id.
153. The Circle School v. Phillips, 270 F. Supp. 2d 616 (E.D. Pa. 2003), aftd, 381 F.3d 172
(3d Cir. 2004).
154. Id. at 625-26.
155. Id. at 623-26 (comparing parental notification requirements in Pledge context with paren-
tal notification in abortion regulations).
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Many of the statutes, for example, contain no direct enforcement
provisions.156 Pledge laws, however, need not have an explicit enforce-
ment mechanism in order to produce mandatory compliance. When Con-
gress first enacted a law endorsing the Pledge, it deliberately neglected to
implement an enforcement scheme. 157 This unusual regulatory paradigm
serves several purposes that protect public officials, yet undermine civil
liberties. If laws that lack formal enforcement mechanisms create the
imprimatur of authoritative rules, other public officials may take action
to enforce them under distinct legal provisions. For example, many state
laws authorize school districts to fire teachers and expel or suspend stu-
dents for insubordination or neglect of duty.15 8 Even in the absence of
formal enforcement mechanisms within the Pledge statutes, other state
officials may use disciplinary laws to threaten individuals who refuse to
recite the Pledge.
Second, as with Pennsylvania's law, some states' laws include pro-
visions allowing students, and sometimes teachers, to decline to recite
the Pledge. Although the Pennsylvania decision held that exemptions
were sufficient to alleviate the compulsory nature of the laws,1 59 it is not
altogether clear that it was correct. As drafted, these statutes are inter-
nally contradictory. On the one hand, they create a legal duty for students
to recite the Pledge. On the other hand, they attempt to comply with
Barnette by providing some sort of exemption provision. The contradic-
tion is even more severe in some jurisdictions because other states' laws
are more direct than Pennsylvania's in imposing a legal duty on students
and teachers to recite the Pledge.1 60 That is, there is a more direct contra-
diction in these laws between the obligation and the exemptions. The
confusion generated by conflicting directives in many of the Pledge laws
enacted since September 11 th increases the chance that local school dis-
tricts will unconstitutionally apply these statutes or that coercion will
arise from the group enterprise of daily recitation of the Pledge. In other
words, even with formal exemption provisions in place, the actual prac-
tices in schools may result in the violation of Barnette's principles.
156. See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. § 22-1-106(2); 105 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/27-3 (2004); Miss.
CODE ANN. § 37-13-6 (2004).
157. Blasi & Shiffrin, supra note 15, at 435 (noting that American Legion lobbyists stated that
the law was intended to be obeyed as an enactment of Congress without regard to the absence of
penalties).
158. See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. § 22-33-106(1)(a) (providing that students may be suspended
or expelled for "continued willful disobedience or open and persistent defiance of proper author-
ity."); UTAH CODE ANN. § 53A- 11-904 (2004) (same); COLO. REV. STAT. § 22-63-301 (providing
that teachers may be dismissed for insubordination); Mo. REV. STAT. § 168.114 (same).
159. Circle School, 270 F. Supp 2d. at 621-22.
160. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. 1003.44 (mandating that students shall recite Pledge every day
with the right hand over the heart, but requiring that students be informed of right not to participate).




What is more, the very practice of having a ritual recitation of the
Pledge every day may be coercive in the context of the public school
setting. Even precatory laws can create a culture of compliance that ef-
fectively establishes an enforceable regime. Indeed, it could be argued
that laws requiring teachers to lead students in the recitation of the
Pledge are unconstitutional even if they allow students to opt out. On this
view, the psychological coercion to participate in this public ritual, as in
the Establishment Clause context, may be the functional equivalent of
legal coercion.' 6 1 To the degree that the atmosphere created by group
recital of the Pledge is one in which dissenters feel ostracized by the so-
cial setting, any public school ceremony incorporating the Pledge vio-
lates Barnette's First Amendment principles.162 Indeed, Governor Jesse
Ventura vetoed a Minnesota Pledge statute that mirrored these states'
laws on the ground that, even with the exemption provision, it violated
Barnette. 1
63
Finally, the exemption provisions themselves may be unconstitu-
tional to the extent that they require parents, students, or teachers to dis-
close their reasons for seeking an exemption. 164 A government directive
requiring one to state a religious, political, or other philosophical objec-
tion to the recitation of the Pledge could itself be an impermissible forced
speech law.
In any event, the recent spate of Pledge laws reflects a renewed
sense of urgency about nationalistic unity and loyalty to the United
States, particularly in schoolchildren. At the same time, it demonstrates
that as a society, we seem to evolve very little in our collective under-
161. Greene, supra note 22, at 451-55. Abner Greene has argued that under current law, psy-
chological coercion of students to participate in publicly-led group utterances, religious or not, might
violate the Constitution. Id. Ultimately, however, Greene concludes that this result need not lead to
the invalidation of Pledge laws. He contends that by adopting a structural view of Establishment
Clause doctrine, from which the psychological coercion argument derives, and by reconceptualizing
our current understanding of the basis of the right not to speak, constitutional doctrine may be read
to forbid state-created psychological coercion of students to participate in religious exercises, but
permit teacher-led Pledge recitations, so long as students have the option to not participate. Id. at
489.
162. Id. at 470-71. But see Sherman v. Cmty. Consol. Sch. Dist. 21 of Wheeling Township,
980 F.2d 437, 444-45 (7th Cir. 1992) (holding that schools may carry on with patriotic exercises so
long as they are not compulsory, but that teachers leading students in recitation of the Pledge was not
inherently compulsory); see also Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 638-39 (1992) (Scalia, J., dissent-
ing) (noting possible inconsistency between Court's analysis of Establishment Clause coercion
principle regarding prayer at public school graduation ceremony and its failure to recognize that the
same students participated in a government-led recital of the Pledge of Allegiance).
163. Minnesota Governor Vetoes Pledge of Allegiance Requirement, Associated Press, May
23, 2002 available at http://www.firstamendmentcenter.org//news.aspxid=3861&SearchString=
venturaveto (last visited September 14, 2004).
164. See, e.g., ARK. CODE ANN. § 6-16-108(b)(2)(A) (2004) (exempting students from recita-
tion of the Pledge if the student or student's parent objects to the recitation on religious, philosophi-
cal, or other grounds); COLO. REV. STAT. § 22-1-106(b) (requiring a parent to file a written note
with the school principal stating an objection to the student's recitation of the Pledge in order to
excuse student). It is also unclear whether allowing parents, as opposed to students, to object satis-
fies the non-compulsion requirement of Barnette.
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standing of the civil liberties implications of laws that compel patriotism
and, accordingly, strip us of individual autonomy.
IV. WHY SOCIAL LEARNING ABOUT FORCED PATRIOTISM DOES NOT
OCCUR
Why does this pattern recur? Why do public officials repeatedly
turn to forced patriotism laws during times of perceived national crisis in
spite of obvious doubts about their constitutionality? Further, to the ex-
tent this pattern does recur, it seems worth examining whether it mirrors
what happens in other areas of civil liberties violations that arise in re-
sponse to national security crises.
A simple, but speculative, answer is that there is almost limitless,
unadulterated political benefit to elected officials who advance these
measures. At least one post-September 1 lth poll indicates that the major-
ity of Americans believe that schoolchildren ought to recite the Pledge
on a daily basis, suggesting implicitly that they disagree with the holding
in Barnette.1 65 Public support for and enactment of patently unconstitu-
tional forced patriotism measures is certainly not unheard of. Following
the Court's decision in Texas v. Johnson, for example, lawmakers con-
tinued to pass flag desecration laws in open defiance of the Court's deci-
sion.1 66 Two-thirds of Americans disagreed with the decision in Johnson
and supported a constitutional amendment exempting flag burning from
First Amendment protection. 67 Thus, political expediency surely offers
one explanation for the recurring pattern of forced patriotism laws.
A related, but distinct, point is that political actors are likely to turn
to forced patriotism measures in the face of great uncertainty. During
times of national crisis, and certainly after the United States has been
attacked, there is likely to be a collective feeling of helplessness. Strong
incentives exist for our government leaders to avoid the perception that
they are doing nothing to address threats or perceived threats. Forced
patriotism laws are a quick and simple, yet intangible, "fix" to more con-
crete problems of national security. They also provide officials with a
safe harbor by generating distraction from actual security problems that
165. See, e.g., G. Donald Ferree, Jr., Patriotism and Its Place in Wisconsin Hearts and Schools,
University of Wisconsin Survey Center, available at http://www.wisc.edu/uwsc/badgrel4.pdf (re-
porting poll by University of Wisconsin Survey Center showing that 70 percent of Wisconsin resi-
dents believe the Pledge should be required in all U.S. schools) (last visited September 14, 2004).
Furthermore, since the Newdow controversy, national polls show that 90 percent of Americans wish
to retain the Pledge's "under God" language. Gina Holland, Poll: Preserve Pledge Phrase, THE
CINCINNATI POST, Mar. 24, 2004, at A2. Of course, this is consistent with polls showing that most
Americans do not support many of the provisions contained in the Bill of Rights. See, e.g., Margaret
Jane Radin, The Jurisprudence of Death: Evolving Standards for the Cruel and Unusual Punish-
ments Clause, 126 U. PA. L. REV. 989, 1035-36 & n.184 (1978) (citing studies).
166. GOLDSTEIN, FLAG CONTROVERSY, supra note 55, at 127-28.
167. See Barry Friedman, Dialogue and Judicial Review, 91 MICH. L. REV. 577, 606 n.142
(1993) (citing poll data).
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may require more instrumental, but also more complex and nuanced,
solutions.
But neither of these explanations is unique to forced patriotism
laws. If they explain the pattern of forced patriotism measures, they also
ought to explain repetition of other civil liberties violations during na-
tional security crises. That is, political expediency and the desire to ap-
pear actively engaged in addressing security should be as likely to com-
pel officials to repeat mass citizen internments as it would to spur them
to adopt mandatory Pledge laws.
Despite these common incentives, it can be argued that the govern-
ment does not repeat its mistakes as severely when it comes to more in-
strumental policy measures addressing national security concerns. Re-
cently, scholars examining civil liberties in the wake of September 11 th
have suggested that in other areas of government policymaking, such as
measures purporting to directly protect national security interests, there
appears to be some form of "social learning" that occurs over time. 61
Social learning suggests that courts and other institutions tend to learn
from past crisis periods that government claims of national security have,
in retrospect, often been exaggerated, thus making people more skeptical
about such claims in the present context. 169 Social learning may also oc-
cur because the revelation of this information also generates attention
from media and public interest organizations vigilant about guarding
against replicating past violations. 1
70
Applying the social learning thesis, Mark Tushnet has "defended"
the Korematsu case as an incidence of social learning that perhaps has
prevented a direct recurrence of similar detentions during crises since
World War H. 171 As Tushnet explains:
The social learning is this: Knowing that government officials in the
past have in fact exaggerated threats to national security or have
taken actions that were ineffective with respect to the threats that ac-
tually were present, we have become increasingly skeptical about
contemporary claims regarding those threats, with the effect that the
scope of proposed government responses to threats has decreased. 172
Tushnet elaborates on his thesis by tracing the historical patterns
similar to those examined in this essay, but describing how social learn-
ing may account for why subsequent generations have generally not re-
168. See, e.g., Tushnet, supra note 10, at 287-90.
169. Id. Other scholars, such as David Cole, are more skeptical about such claims. They argue
that in fact such social learning may simply result in government decisionmakers learning to better
mask the repetition of past civil liberties offenses. Cole, supra note 10, at 3-4.
170. Robert M. Chesney, Civil Liberties and the Terrorism Prevention Paradigm: The Guilt by
Association Critique, 101 MiCH. L. REv. 1408, 1417 (2003).
171. Tushnet, supra note 10, at 307.
172. Id. at 283-84.
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peated the civil liberties mistakes of the past in the context of instrumen-
tal policy measures. 173 At the very least, Tushnet argues, we learn from
our mistakes to the extent that we do not repeat precisely the same er-
rors.174 Using Korematsu as an illustration, he describes how the retro-
spective view of the government's arguments about national security as
having been greatly exaggerated has led us to be more skeptical about
taking similar action in response to subsequent national threats.1
75
Tushnet supports his claim by describing how the current crisis has not
yielded policy measures as sweeping as those during the Japanese in-
ternment, and that many of the current potential civil liberties concerns
are focused on non-citizens, as opposed to American citizens of foreign
ancestry.
176
Another example he could have drawn upon was the unsuccessful
effort of Senator S. I. Hayakawa to amend federal law to permit the de-
tention of Iranian nationals in the United States during the Iranian hos-
tage crisis. 177 That episode may illustrate Tushnet's social learning thesis
in two ways. First, the measure did not pass despite extreme national
antipathy toward Iran. Second, had it passed, it would not have affected
American citizens of Iranian descent.
If social learning does occur, to some degree, with respect to con-
crete policy measures designed to protect national security, the same
learning experience does not appear to occur, or at the very least occurs
at a slower pace, in the context of symbolic forced patriotism measures.
As the repeated examples from the historical cycles of fear described
above illustrate, government actors repeatedly turn to forced patriotism
measures in times of national security crises, seemingly without regard
for constitutional limitations. It seems worth exploring why social learn-
ing does not occur here.
Before doing so, however, I react to one possible critique of the the-
sis that social learning does not occur in the context of forced patriotism.
One might reasonably challenge my assertion by pointing to the preva-
lence of exemption provisions in many of the current wave of Pledge
laws. These exemptions might provide some evidence that learning has
indeed occurred, and that legislators are cognizant of Barnette. One re-
sponse to this is that if these exemption provisions manifest any learning,
it is not the type of social learning that occurs from internalizing the wis-
dom and experience of past mistakes. If the experience in Colorado is at
all representative, lawmakers have little use for Barnette or for federal
courts that apply it. After a federal court barred enforcement of Colo-
173. Id. at 284-90.
174. Id. at 292.
175. Id. at 284-90.
176. Id. at 296-97; see also Eric L. Muller, 12/7 and 9/11: War, Liberties, and the Lessons of
History, 104 W. VA. L. REV. 571 (2002).
177. See 127 CONG. REC. 178-79 (1981); 126 CONG. REc. 5815-18 (1980).
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rado's mandatory Pledge law, the Governor and the majority leader of
the State Senate publicly attacked the ruling, saying that there was no
constitutional basis for it and boasting that the law would be upheld after
a trial on the merits.178 Such statements demonstrate no social learning,
but rather illustrate that there is actually very little understanding among
public officials about the problems with mandatory oaths. Indeed, based
on their public statements, it is clear that lawmakers' goals in enacting
mandatory Pledge laws today are often no different from in the era pre-
ceding Barnette. Another stark illustration of the lack of learning was
demonstrated when students at one Denver public middle school were
forced to recite the Pledge even after the temporary restraining order in
the Colorado Pledge case. 79 Moreover, as pointed out earlier, the pres-
ence of formal exemptions in the face of legal commands to recite the
Pledge does not necessarily eliminate problems of coercion and unconsti-
tutional application. Finally, many of the laws enacted since September
1 th do not exempt teachers from compelled recitation. 80 Thus, without
regard to the existence of some exemptions, forced patriotism is alive
and well in the twenty-first century.
If I am right that social learning has not occurred in the forced pa-
triotism context, there are a few reasons that might explain that phe-
nomenon. It may be that two preconditions necessary for social learning
in other civil liberties contexts are not present in the forced patriotism
area. First, scholars have argued that social learning occurs when offi-
cials overreact to threats of national security and develop policy re-
sponses that are not in fact well designed to enhance security.' 8' In hind-
sight, such overreactions tend to be revealed, thus leading to greater
skepticism in future generations. 1
82
In the case of forced patriotism laws, no such precondition exists.
Lawmakers who sponsor forced patriotism initiatives can be viewed as
overreacting, but not because they have misrepresented any threats. No
one pretends, except in the most abstract sense, that flag salutes and
Pledge of Allegiance recitals directly enhance our national security.
Thus, there is no hindsight, no second guessing, of patriotism measures
because there has been no initial representation of their effectiveness.
178. Monte Whaley, 4 School Districts Can't Force Pledge; Ban Temporary; Hearing Set
Friday, DENVER POST, Aug. 17, 2003, at BI (quoting Governor Bill Owens and State Senator John
Andrews). Indeed, in a television appearance on a local public affairs talk show, Senator Andrews
implied that Barnette was wrongly decided.
179. See The Open Forum, DENVER POST, Nov. 16, 2003, at E2 (describing the enjoined Colo-
rado law as "requiring" students to recite the Pledge and quoting letters from students reflecting that
they were being forced to recite the Pledge on a daily basis).
180. See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. § 22-1-106(2) (not exempting teachers from compelled
recitation on the grounds of personal conscience); FLA. STAT. ANN. 1003.44 (exempting unwilling
students, but not teachers, from Pledge recital); MO. REV. STAT. § 171.021 (same).
181. Tushnet, supra note 10, at 287-90.
182. Id.
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Later generations may look back with skepticism, but not because we
think the state has lied to us.
Second, the stakes for lawmakers are simply not as high when
forced patriotism measures are challenged. The social learning hypothe-
sis depends to a significant degree on government institutions' respon-
siveness to retrospective factual analysis of historical national security
crises. 83 At least part of that responsiveness may be attributable to legal
sanctions and constraints that courts may externally impose in public
interest litigation.' 84 Legal challenges to tangible national security meas-
ures may result in high social costs, costs that may reflect adversely on
the politicians who initially proposed and supported such laws. For ex-
ample, unconstitutional regulations of conduct in the enforcement of
national security laws may lead to suppressed evidence, invalidated con-
victions, or civil claims for substantial damages, at least against the law's
enforcers. Such factors may be sufficient to deter government decision-
makers from repeating their past mistakes, or at least encouraging cau-
tion.
But constitutional remedies are also available in the context of
forced patriotism measures. Surely these must provide disincentives even
to lawmakers bent on reelection, as there are costs that may have to be
weighed in determining whether to advance measures of highly ques-
tionable constitutionality.
Unlike other types of policy measures, however, forced patriotism
laws may, in reality, be less susceptible to meaningful constitutional
remedies than would more instrumental policy measures. First, legisla-
tive bodies, such as state legislatures or school boards, establish most
forced patriotism measures. Despite the apparent unconstitutionality of
such measures, legislators have little to fear from a constitutional attack
on forced patriot acts. Under constitutional remedies law, legislators are
absolutely immune for any actions taken in their legislative capacity,
even if their acts are blatantly and intentionally unconstitutional. 85
Moreover, it may be difficult for plaintiffs who wish to challenge
such laws to find an appropriate defendant. Many Pledge laws, for ex-
ample, do not provide for specific enforcement by the state or for state
penalties for noncompliance. Accordingly, it may be difficult to identify
an appropriate state defendant to sue for injunctive relief.186 Lawmakers
thereby make it difficult for civil rights litigants to stop the law's en-
forcement on a statewide level to the extent that they permit the decen-
183. Id.
184. Chesney, supra note 170, at 1417.
185. See Tenney v. Brandhove, 341 U.S. 367, 376 (1951) (holding that state legislators are
absolutely immune from constitutional tort damage actions).
186. See Ex Parte Young, 209 U.S. 123, 159-60 (1908) (allowing suits against state officials for
prospective injunctive relief barring enforcement of unconstitutional state laws).
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tralization of the law's enforcement. As a practical matter, it may be dif-
ficult, with the possible exception of a defendant class action, to sue all
the potential enforcers of such laws.
Local officials who do enforce forced patriotism laws may be sub-
ject to claims for damages. In the context of Pledge laws, school officials
may be liable for compensatory damages should they force a teacher or
student to engage in patriotic speech involuntarily.' 87 The effectiveness
of such a remedy may be limited, however, because it will often be diffi-
cult to prove actual damages in such a circumstance, 188 and nominal
damages may provide little deterrence. 189 In some cases, student or
teacher plaintiffs may be able to demonstrate entitlement to punitive
damages, but they would first have to demonstrate a high degree of men-
tal culpability in order to sustain such an award. 190 Moreover, it is
unlikely that a jury would award punitive damages where local officials
can claim that the state imposed upon them a legal duty to require the
Pledge. Thus, deterrence that might ordinarily be generated by the possi-
bility of damages actions in other civil rights contexts may not deter offi-
cials in forced patriotism cases.
Actions for injunctive and declaratory relief may yield substantial
deterrence if meaningful costs are associated with their effective en-
forcement. Unlike structural reform injunctions, however, it is unlikely
that it will be costly for public officials to comply with prohibitory in-
junctions. The state's officials may simply throw up their hands, cease
enforcement of the unconstitutional policy, and blame the whole thing on
the intervention of meddlesome, activist courts.
Moreover, savvy defendants may simply abandon their unconstitu-
tional policies in the face of lawsuits, thus creating a moving target for
187. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2000).
188. See Memphis Cmty. Sch. Dist. v. Stachura, 477 U.S. 299, 307 (1986) (holding that dam-
ages may be awarded for deprivations of rights only if the deprivation results in actual harm); Carey
v. Piphus, 435 U.S. 247, 263-64 (1978) (holding that compensable injury must result directly from
denial of constitutional right). In addition, local officials might try to claim qualified immunity from
damages if they can successfully demonstrate that reasonable officials in their position would not
have known that their actions violated a clearly established constitutional right. Harlow v. Fitzgerald,
457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982). But see Holloman ex rel. Holloman v. Harland, 370 F.3d 1252, 1269 (11th
Cir. 2004) (holding that a reasonable school official would have known that disciplining student for
refusing to recite Pledge violated clearly established First Amendment rights).
189. What is more, attorneys' fees may not necessarily be awarded in cases where the sole
remedy is nominal damages. Farrar v. Hobby, 506 U.S. 103, 115 (1992) (holding that in some cases
where only relief obtained in civil rights action is nominal damages, it may be appropriate to award
no statutory fee award at all). But see Barber v. T.D. Williamson, Inc., 254 F.3d 1223, 1230-32 (10th
Cir. 2001) (suggesting that fee awards might be appropriate in nominal damages cases where litiga-
tion achieves certain public goals).
190. Smith v. Wade, 461 U.S. 30, 56 (1983) (holding that punitive damages under 42 U.S.C. §
1983 may be awarded only where "defendant's conduct is shown to be motivated by evil motive or
intent, or when it involves reckless or callous indifference to the federally protected rights of oth-
ers").
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litigants challenging forced patriotism laws.191 What is more, there is a
more tangible consequence if officials abandon or even repeal their
forced patriotism measures. Under the Supreme Court's decision in
Buckhannon Board and Care Home, Inc. v. West Virginia Department of
Health and Human Resources, 92 repeal or substantial modification of
forced patriotism laws during the course of litigation may undermine
plaintiffs' claims for recovery of attorneys' fees, 193 the only substantial
financial consequence that might flow from the adoption of forced patri-
otism laws.' 94 Thus, to the degree that attorneys' fees act as a general
deterrent for future unconstitutional conduct in cases where other reme-
dies do not, public officials might undermine that deterrent effect by
avoiding fee liability if they abandon forced patriotism laws shortly after
litigation begins. Accordingly, this too may limit the possibility of legal
action serving as a meaningful deterrent to the future adoption of such
laws.
In combination, these remedies problems limit the possibilities of
effective constitutional enforcement in the context of forced patriotism
laws. The lack of remedies, in turn, minimizes the chance that true social
learning will occur.
CONCLUSION
Throughout our nation's experience the historical cycles of fear
have led to the widespread adoption of forced patriotism measures.
Given the apparent lack of social learning regarding forced patriotism
measures, what can American society reasonably do to discourage con-
tinual repetition of these cycles? It seems worth exploring what types of
conditions would be necessary to create social learning in the forced pa-
triotism context.
Perhaps our society needs mechanisms to facilitate greater transpar-
ency in the discourse about the need, or lack thereof, for forced patriot-
ism laws, or better understandings about the impact such laws have on
the independent thinking of free citizens. Or perhaps we need to pay
more attention to the history of forced patriotism laws and their profound
impact on dissenters in the past century.
How can we best accomplish this? The paradoxical conclusion that
I have come to, is that we do indeed need the Pledge of Allegiance in our
191. See Monte Whaley, Pledge Law Set Aside for 9 Months; Action Gives General Assembly a
Chance to Rewrite or Eliminate Legislation, DENVER POST, Aug. 24, 2003, at B1.
192. 532 U.S. 598, 605 (2001) (holding that plaintiffs may not be prevailing parties under fee-
shifting statutes where the defendant voluntarily changes its behavior after the onset of litigation but
before there is a "judicially sanctioned change in the legal relationship of the parties").
193. 42 U.S.C. § 1988(a) (2000).
194. But see Watson v. County of Riverside, 300 F.3d 1092, 1095-96 (9th Cir. 2002) (holding




schools. But when I say this, I do not mean to endorse the ritualistic,
value-inculcating, unthinking, rote recitation of the Pledge that is the
hallmark of forced patriotism laws.
Rather, it is clear to me that American children ought to be taught
about the Pledge in its historical context. We need education about the
Pledge, where it came from, what its meaning is. We need meaningful
and critical discourse about the multiple understandings and paradox of
patriotism. We need to teach children the history of Gobitis and Barnette,
and explain to them how shamefully our society has treated its dissident
members in times of national crisis. In short, we need to teach students to
think for themselves, and to do this we must enhance the real civic edu-
cation of our youth. 195 Then, and only then, will we achieve social learn-
ing about forced patriotism.
195. At least one other scholar has come to a similar conclusion. In a thoughtful article pub-
lished after this paper was presented, but before it was published, Professor Martin Guggenheim
argues we should demand that teachers incorporate the Pledge into a valuable civics lesson that
includes instruction about the right not to participate and the dangers of state compelled expression.
Martin Guggenheim, Stealth Indoctrination: Forced Speech in the Classroom, 2004 U. CHI. LEGAL
F. 57, 79-82.
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